Politics in Wales is often portrayed as being relatively consensual when compared with the rest of the United Kingdom and enjoying healthy levels of trust between voters and elites.
Introduction
We live in an era where the majority of people in Britain do not trust politicians, believe that they do not care about what ordinary people think and that they prefer playing party political games over furthering public interests (Fieldhouse et al. 2016) . In fact, politicians are now less trusted than estate agents or bankers, with less than a fourth of people expecting them to tell voters the truth (Ipsos MORI 2016) . While sentiments like these are of course not unique to Britain (World Economic Forum 2016), they nonetheless raise concerns about the current state of British democracy and the ability of its elites to effectively engage with voters.
Against this backdrop of discontent, the political environment in Wales, however, is often portrayed as being relatively harmonious. Although certainly not without its own divisions, Wales has shown that cooperation between main political parties is possible in a way that cooperation between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in Westminster seems improbable, that a broadly supported vision for the pace and extent of devolution can be reached so that debates on independence are not quite as partisan and divisive as those in Scotland, and that a formal cross-community power sharing agreement is not necessary to allow unionists and nationalists to work together within the devolved system unlike in Northern Ireland. Instead, political debates in Wales are often seen to play out on a slightly narrower ideological spectrum, characterised by soft-nationalist cultural politics, devolutionmaximising constitutional reform, and a social democratic policy agenda (Jones and Scully 2008; Moon 2013 Moon , 2016 . Welsh politicians also have a more positive reputation among voters. In contrast to the broader trend of disillusionment with politicians, most Welsh voters trust their Assembly Members and believe in their integrity (Scully and Jones 2015b) .
Recent events, however, appear to be providing some evidence that the political environment in Wales is not particularly consensual after all. Although the 2017 general election in Wales saw a return of traditional two-party politics, i one does not have to look hard to find instances of disconnect between voters and elites. In contrast to the widespread cross-party campaign in
Wales backing the membership of the European Union, ii 52.5% of the voters opted to 'take back control' instead, and the Abolish the Welsh Assembly Party and UKIP Wales surprised many with their good performances at the 2016 devolved election. The political environment in Wales appears to be in flux as voters seem increasingly willing to challenge the status quo.
Policy divisions between voters and elites in Wales may in fact be more substantial than often portrayed.
This paper looks at the extent to which policy divisions exist between voters and candidates in Wales. It does so by using data from the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study and the 2016 Welsh Election Study to compare voters' and candidates' views on policy agenda, policy positions on a range of policy issues, and whose interests they believe that Assembly Members ought to prioritise when carrying out their duties in the National Assembly for Wales. As such, this paper provides a complex account of voter-candidate congruence (or the lack thereof) at the different points of the policy-making process.
The analysis uncovers strong evidence that the relationship between voters and candidates in Wales is not particularly harmonious. Significant differences exist between them in all three aspects of the policy-making process focused on in this paper. 
Political environment in Wales
The perception of less divisive politics in Wales is usually based on the idea that a degree of common understanding exists over politics, policy, and implementation, which together lead to a more positive relationship between voters and elites. First, the political climate in Wales has been characterised by stability and cooperation. Second, policy debates in Wales are often perceived to play out on a quite narrow ideological spectrum. This has been labelled the Welshminster consensus, embodying i) devomaximising constitutional reform, ii) social democratic policy agenda, and iii) soft-nationalist cultural politics (Moon 2013 (Moon , 2016 . In practice, this consensus manifests in broad acceptance of interventionist government programmes, willingness to extend the welfare state, asking for additional devolved powers but not independence, and the continuing commitment to Welsh language and heritage. Public opinion data suggests that these broad preferences are not only shared by the elites, but that they also enjoy strong support among the Welsh public (Scully 2017; Scully and Jones 2015a) . Wales does not seem to play host to issues quite as divisive as the independence debate in Scotland or the unionist-nationalist clash in Northern Ireland.
Third, scholars point to emerging evidence of a 'made in Wales' approach to administering public policies. A well-documented example of this concerns youth justice which tends to be implemented less punitively in Wales than in England (Haines 2010; St.Denny 2016) . In fact, it can be seen as part of a broader trend towards an approach that prioritises prevention over punishment and the balancing of short term needs with long term needs, as set out also in the There is more to the policy process and understanding policy outcomes, however, than policy positions. Policy agenda and principles that guide parliamentary behaviour also matter (e.g., Howlett et al. 2009; Knill and Tosun 2012; Sabatier 1991) . candidates (35% of all candidates) v and is highly representative of the general population of candidates. When using the Duncan index of dissimilarity on the distributions of two major characteristics -partisanship and candidacy type -within the sample and the full population of candidates, it yields values of 0.07 and 0.01, respectively (Duncan and Duncan 1955 
Policy divisions between voters and candidates
I start by comparing the percentage of voters and candidates who prioritise each of the seven policy areas. These are presented in Candidates of both these parties are in fact less likely to prioritise economy than their voters, but the differences here are small. The disconnect between voters and candidates over whether economic issues should take priority is driven by differences within the more leftist parties.
A closer look at the saliency given to immigration reveals an even starker discrepancy. While immigration is not considered as the most important issue by any candidate of the five parties represented in the National Assembly for Wales following the 2016 devolved election, it is by some voters of all these parties. do not find meaningful differences between voters' and candidates' attitudes towards European integration. The difference of 0.4 (4.0 versus 3.6) is small, given the scale of the measure, and does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In fact, both an average voter and an average candidate feature a strong dose of Euroscepticism as they are in the 'integration has gone too far' half of the spectrum. The former is of course unsurprising as Wales voted for the UK to leave the European Union by 52.5% to 47.5% in 2016, but the latter is somewhat unexpected since most politicians were thought to have campaigned for a remain vote in the lead up to the referendum. What this data suggests is that the remain stance was a grudging acceptance of the European Union membership rather than an expression of one's Europhile nature for more Welsh politicians than perhaps is often perceived.
Moving on to voters' and candidates' economic positions, two of the three policy statements reveal statistically significant differences. On average, candidates are more inclined to favour governmental policies that re-distribute income than voters (3.9 versus 3.5) and less likely to believe that big business benefits at the expense of workers (3.7 versus 4.0). Overall, it is apparent that there are salient policy divisions between voters and candidates in Wales. These differences are by no means big enough to suggest that the political system is fundamentally unrepresentative, but they do exist and should be addressed. This is especially the case in the current political environment where the levels of public trust in politicians and politics more broadly are uncomfortably low.
Conclusions
Elites in the UK, and beyond, are increasingly seen as being out of touch with voters, with the growing disconnect between them seen as a salient feature of the current political climate. It has been argued that public disillusionment with politics has led to not just growing levels of electoral volatility (Denver et al. 2012 ), but also helped to fuel the successes of populist parties who have made it a key element of their political identity (Ford and Goodwin 2014 to think about immigration as the most important policy priority, whereas less likely to think that about economy. In addition, voters tend to hold considerably more authoritarian attitudes than candidates. The most fundamental difference between the two, however, is in their views towards whose interests Assembly Members should prioritise. Voters find it significantly less acceptable for Assembly Members to discard their voters' views in favour of their own views or those of their party. There are some salient policy divisions between voters and candidates in Wales.
There are three broader points arising from this study. First, these findings support a growing body of evidence that the political environment in Wales is not particularly consensual after all and the relationship between voters and elites is characterised by considerable disconnect.
Welsh voters are not just willing to go against the advice of the political establishment as was shown by the European Union membership referendum in 2016, but they also hold somewhat different attitudes than candidates. They are more likely to think of immigration as the most important policy priority, hold considerably more authoritarian policy positions, and believe in a more voter-centred style of representation. Rather than telling a story of shared attitudes, the dynamic of voter-candidate congruence in Wales emphasises a degree of disconnect.
Second, the presence of significant policy divisions between voters and candidates in Wales suggests that elites need to intensify their efforts to engage with the public. It has been shown that higher levels of voter-elite congruence are linked to greater satisfaction with democracy (e.g., André and Depauw 2017; Brandenburg and Johns 2014; Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017) as well as electoral turnout (Heath 2016) , both of which are seen to contribute to the health of a democracy. Not only do they encourage a strong civic culture and compliance with public policies, but they also empower and legitimise political institutions. In contrast, disconnect between voters and elites implies that counting on permissive consensus is not sufficient. It is evident that elites need to engage in greater dialogue with voters over the different aspects of the policy-making process to counter the perception of being out of touch.
Third, this study contributes to the broader debates on how the idea of elite-voter congruence should be conceptually thought of and empirically studied. The presence of salient divisions between voters and candidates with regards to all three aspects of the policy-making process focused on here suggests that the conventional reliance on policy positions alone to capture congruence is not sufficient. The level of disconnect between voters and candidates can, and does, vary across the different aspects of the policy-making process and this possibility needs to be accounted for. It is vital to take a more nuanced approach to evaluating the degree of voter-elite congruence and not simply compare policy positions, but also policy priorities and preferred approach to parliamentary representation. Ideally, this should be done by focusing on voters and elites in the same political context and at the same point in time. Table A1 ). In order to show that the sample is representative on these two characteristics, the Duncan index of dissimilarity is used. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater discrepancy between the full population and the sample (Duncan and Duncan 1955) . The comparison of partisanship in the sample and the full population of candidates yields a value of 0.07, while the comparison of candidacy type has a value of 0.01. The survey sample is highly representative of the general population of candidates on these two key characteristics. Costello et al. 2012; Leimgruber et al. 2010; Reher 2015; Teperoglou et al. 2014) . Other data have of course been used as well as some scholars have instead opted for party or government positions (e.g., Golder and Stramski 2010; Hakhverdian 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2009 ) and others for the positions of elected parliamentarians (e.g., Hanretty et al. 2017; Karyotis et al. 2014; Vasilopoulou and Gattermann 2013 viii Responses that did not fall under these categories were omitted from the analysis. They constituted less than 10% of the total responses. ix There is no formal baseline standard established in representation literature to classify the differences in policy agenda, policy positions, and approach to parliamentary representation as small, large, etc. As such, the analysis presents not only the extent of the differences but also the underlying average scores for voters and candidates in order for that the substantive meaning of the observed differences to be easier to understand.
x It is important to compare voters' and candidates' policy positions separately across the different survey items as a growing body of literature suggests that voter-elite congruence can vary according to the issue at stake (e.g., Costello et al. 2012; Freire and Belchior 2013; Walczak and van der Brug 2012) . xi Although there is little evidence from other Western democracies regarding voter-elite congruence on policy agenda at a specific time as existing studies tend to compare elites' issue attention at T with public opinion at T-1, there is some indication that the differences observed here are not unique to Wales. Lindeboom (2012) shows that Dutch voters were more likely than elites to prioritise issues surrounding immigration between 1981 -2006 , and Reher (2014 finds that German voters were more likely than candidates to consider immigration and labour issues as the most important ones in 2009 but less likely to think that of economy. xii Table 2 is limited to parties that won seats in the National Assembly for Wales at the 2016 devolved election. Information on candidates and voters of other parties is available upon request. xiii These patterns of congruence in policy positions are common in Western democracies. It has been frequently shown that voter-elite congruence in Europe is high in terms of the left-right dimension and specific economic policies, but elites tend to hold more liberal views than voters (e.g., Belchior and Freire 2012; Costello et al. 2012; Dolný and Baboš 2015; Vasilopoulou and Gattermann 2013) .
